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A tale of two statues 
Contemporary conflict reporting 
constraints and the Battle of Baghdad 
Abstract: Although television conflict reporting has usually been limited by 
risks to journalists’ safety, the death throes of Ba’athist Iraq in April 2003 
provided viewers with a unique opportunity to vicariously witness the fall of 
a large modern city.  Yet if the iconic moment of the Second Gulf War came 
when Saddam Hussein’s statue in Firdos Square was toppled, then it was at 
the expense of another image event which unfolded earlier a short distance 
away.  The US military’s violent destruction of the equestrian statue close to 
the ‘Hands of Victory’ monument better encapsulated the conflict than the 
sterile bloodless ‘cakewalk’ description with which it is usually labelled. This 
article demonstrates how the tale of these two statues is also in some ways the 
tale of two Fox News correspondents; and how an alienation from military 
service conditions and methods can leave reporters and their audiences with 
no sense of what the participants on their screens endured in order to reach 
Baghdad; or what they had also inflicted upon others. In retrospect, the cir-
cumstances which allowed one Fox reporter to provide the world with what 
might have been its first taste of live, unedited combat footage seem more 
like an accidental success than the result of systematic best practices.  This 
is so even when this network and even its most credible host work to ensure 
a partisan perspective dominates all their broadcasts.
Keywords: best practice, combat footage, conflict reporting, Iraq, military, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, television, trauma, war correspondence
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CONFLICT reporting has always posed a plethora of challenges; including the risk of the journalist’s own trauma, injury or even death (Behr, 1987; Cottle, 2007; Herr, 1991; Mathews, 1957).  Yet even if reporters and the 
outlets that employ them are able to overcome the restrictions imposed by the 
combatants—as well as the technical limitations created by the equipment and 
channels required to convey content to mass audiences (Cottle; Mathews)—they 
are still frequently confronted by their lack of familiarity with military operations 
and cultures (Braestrup, 1983; West, 2006).  This situation has arisen since the 
advent of modern volunteer armed forces and can lead to inaccuracies which 
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unintentionally distort the impressions of publics and political decision makers 
alike (Braestrup; Reynolds, 2007; United States Army Center of Military History, 
2010; Yetiv, 1997). However, despite the industry’s use of expert opinion and 
studio ‘talking heads’ to augment the dwindling number of journalists with prior 
military service (Poole, 2003; Greg Kelly recounts, 2008), it appears to be the po-
litical constraints within some media organisations which ultimately shape what 
aspects they cover, even when this minimises the achievements of a conflict’s 
participants or disguises their failures.   
At the start of the 21st century, the United States embarked on a military 
adventure in Iraq that threatened the country’s global prestige in a way not seen 
since the Vietnam conflict (Judt & Lacorne, 2005; Stam & Shohat, 2007).  Al-
though there was a tendency to portray this campaign as a continuation of the 
Kuwait crisis (Reynolds, 2007; Woods, 2008; Woods, Palkki & Stout, 2011), it 
became a profoundly different conflict to the one audiences were told to expect 
(Ricks, 2006).  This affected the way some outlets and individual reporters por-
trayed the death throes of Ba’athist Iraq on April 9, 2003.  Television coverage 
has a tendency to create image-centric experiences which audiences find more 
compelling than text-based accounts (Eveland & Seo, 2007).  When television 
is the main source of news information for most Americans (Lin, 2009), their 
ability to make sense of what is unfolding as a result of their government’s for-
eign policy initiatives can be affected by what they can see as well as what they 
cannot.  This selective framing (Scheufele, 1999) is similar to what US viewers 
were exposed to in the First Gulf War in January and February 1991 when CNN 
dominated the airwaves in the US. This time, however, CNN had been partially 
superseded by a rival 24 hour news channel, Fox News (Collins, 2004).      
The wars that weren’t?
When first published, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s (1995) assertions 
that the First Gulf War would not take place, was not really taking place, and 
therefore did not take place, seemed highly contentious.  Baudrillard contended 
that the constant broadcasting of precision air strike footage obscured the real 
cost of those operations and of the conflict as a whole.  Interestingly, although 
for slightly different reasons, this was the same conclusion reached by branches 
of the US military (United States Department of Defence—hereinafter US DoD, 
1992) as well Saddam’s regime (Woods, 2008).  This realisation also influenced 
how the initial stages of the Second Gulf War between March 20 and April 10 
would be conducted and reported.  The media pooling system implemented by 
coalition forces during the First Gulf War created widespread resentment among 
the news teams covering the conflict (Kelly, 2001).  Because the US DoD insisted 
that only journalists from coalition countries such as America, the UK and France 
could accompany the ground forces involved in Iraq’s eviction from Kuwait, 
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most of the world’s media had to rely on the daily briefings provided by Cen-
tral Command in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (Cottle, 2007).  This meant there was a 
similar environment to the infamous Five O’Clock Follies used to brief reporters 
in Saigon during the Vietnam conflict (Braestrup, 1983; Herr, 1991). However, 
while the official summaries of the day’s events could include thermal imagery of 
laser-guided bombs destroying multi-story buildings in Baghdad, whatever lim-
ited news video of ground operations could be gathered was censored to prevent 
Iraq from acquiring intelligence on Coalition movements (Schwarzkopf, 1992). 
The journalists assigned by lottery to various units were usually only able to 
gather information from divisional or brigade level headquarters due to the risks 
inherent in intensive mechanised operations (Cordingley, 1996; ibid.).  They were 
also dependent on the forces they were with for satellite transmission of their re-
cordings; a task that was not a high priority during the four-day blitzkrieg which 
saw some Coalition forces threatened with immobilisation through either a lack 
of supplies or sheer exhaustion (Yetiv, 1997).  
The culmination of the campaign’s limited objectives was the liberation of 
Kuwait City (US DoD, 1992) and it was this event which finally gave American 
television news the images they wanted.  In an eerie parallel with the scenes 
witnessed just over 12 years later, viewers in 1991 were also confronted with 
pictures of jubilant civilians and victorious US Marines celebrating an Iraqi 
military disaster (NBC News: Liberation of Kuwait, February 1991, 2014).  Yet 
the prominence given to the Marines, despite the diversionary aspects of their 
contribution convinced the US Army that a new media management policy was 
required to highlight their role in any future conflict.  This system of embedding, 
under which journalists could travel with the headquarters elements of units as 
small as battalion or even task force size, was tested during its deployments to 
Bosnia (Atkinson, 2004) and was one which randomly selected journalists would 
benefit from in the Second Gulf War (ibid.; Poole 2003; Ricchiardi, 2003; West 
& Smith, 2003).  
The arbitrary nature of the embedding programme meant reporters could 
not anticipate which units they would be assigned to.  The programme had also 
been expanded to include all the service arms of the US forces, as well as Allied 
contingents such as the British Army’s 1st Armoured Division.  Correspondents 
such as the Evening Standard’s Oliver Poole (2003)—who had previously served 
in Britain’s Territorial Army—were keenly aware of the different opportunities 
available between joining an American armoured battalion expected to seize the 
Iraqi capital and a placement on board a US Navy vessel or with a logistics unit. 
Unlike virtually every one of his contemporaries, Poole was not estranged from 
his country’s armed forces and was familiar with military procedures; though 
admittedly, not the shared beliefs and assumptions of the American Army.  The 
aspect of the embedding system which most surprised some of the journalists 
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involved was the level of access they were granted (Greg Kelly recounts, 2008; 
Poole; Ricchiardi, 2003).  However, this very access raises concerns about whose 
views the embedded reporters were able or expected to convey.
Influential communications scholars such as Edward Herman (1999) and 
Daniel Hallin (1997) have long been concerned about media coverage which 
emphasises official sources and perspectives.  They believe this allows govern-
ment sources to dominate the discourse surrounding controversial issues, while 
marginalising those who oppose the policies governments attempt to implement. 
When the policy being debated is whether to intervene militarily in another na-
tion state (Ricks, 2006; Woodward, 2004), then how elite opinions are portrayed 
can be critical in determining public opinion (Hallin, 1986).  The build-up to 
the Second Gulf War was marred by intense debates within the administration 
of George W. Bush and throughout the capitals of America’s traditional friends 
(Ricks; Woodward).  Yet because the US government’s divisions were only oc-
casionally aired in public and Bush’s Democratic rivals feared appearing ‘soft’ 
on national security issues in the aftermath of 9/11 (Ricks), domestic elite views 
opposing the invasion struggled to attain what Hallin (1986) describes as a level 
of legitimate controversy.  International reluctance to participate in Saddam’s 
removal also resulted in concerted attacks on French ‘intransigence’ (House now 
serving ‘freedom fries’, 2003)—despite France’s long-standing involvement with 
an under-reported aerial campaign designed to contain Iraq in the aftermath of the 
First Gulf War (Woodward, 2004).  Ironically, the television network leading these 
attacks also employed a field reporter who had participated in those air strikes. 
Fox News Corporation’s Greg Kelly was a US Marine Corps aviator who, 
at the onset of the Second Gulf War, was still an officer in the Marine Reserves 
(Coscarelli, 2012; Greg Kelly recounts, 2008).  Although his operational expe-
rience was as a pilot, he was assigned to the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division 
(Mechanised) prior to its crossing of the Iraq/Kuwait border.  His live broadcasts 
from the back of an armoured vehicle were only possible because of the advances 
in satellite communications that had occurred since 1991 (Inmarsat award, 
2014).).  The increased portability of the systems used by coalition and reporters 
alike enabled Kelly to stream continuous footage back to the US accompanied by 
his improvised comments (Greg Kelly recounts, 2008; The thunder run, 2010). 
However, it was his previous immersion in the US military which enabled him 
to appreciate the calibre of the soldiers alongside whom he was working (Ricks, 
1997).  Regardless of the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the Marines, 
Kelly appeared to genuinely admire the overall training and professionalism of the 
Division’s 2nd Brigade (Greg Kelly recounts. 2008).  His ability to straddle this 
societal divide between those intimately aware of the challenges facing service 
personnel and their families and those who are not (Wright, 2008), coincided 
with the overwhelmingly pro-invasion coverage of Fox News in general (Lin, 
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2009).  Yet within an outlet known for its strident jingoism and paucity of indepth 
analysis on anything other than Republican Party machinations (Swint, 2008), 
Kelly’s measured and informative statements stood in stark contrast to Fox’s 
usual fare.  However, even after taking his personal performance into account 
the initial images Kelly provided of unopposed thrusts into Western Iraq still 
conformed to Baudrillard’s (1995) idea of a bloodless misrepresentation—one 
which also rested on the myths and illusory lessons of the First Gulf War. 
The performance of the Iraqi military during the Kuwaiti crisis was analysed 
by Iraq as well as its opponents.  Although both sides were tempted to attribute 
the Iraqi collapse to the extensive airpower used against them, there was a shared 
sense that airpower alone would not be sufficient to thwart Saddam in any fu-
ture crisis (Woods, 2008; USACMH, 2010). Nonetheless, the Iraqis considered 
that their opponents wanted to keep the level of their own casualties low and 
also sensitive to charges they were responsible for the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians (Woods; Woods et al., 2011).  As a result, Iraq appears to have made 
a conscious decision to avoid utilising its residual mechanised forces in open 
terrain.  Instead, infantry armed with light anti-tank weapons and assault rifles 
would attempt to inflict politically unacceptable losses on coalition units in 
the hope that this might lead to a negotiated settlement and leave Saddam with 
control over his capital and the central Sunni regions of the country (Woods, 
Pease, Stout, Murray & Lacey, 2006).  Coalition forces were also aware of this 
possibility and, as they approached Baghdad at the end of March 2003, the idea 
of having to operate armoured vehicles in an urban setting while defeating the 
Saddam Fedayeen and other paramilitary forces weighed heavily on senior 
commanders (Reynolds, 2007).  However, one solution to this dilemma was to 
destroy the regime’s centre of gravity (von Clausewitz, 1982; Gordon & Trainor, 
2007; Zucchino, 2004a), and drive straight for Saddam’s palace complexes.  
This concept was originally deemed too ambitious by the 3rd Division’s 
commander General Buford Blount. As a compromise, an initial ‘thunder run’ 
was ordered through the outskirts of Baghdad and it was this enterprise that Fox’s 
Greg Kelly was to broadcast live on April 5 (Lacey, 2007). This time, Kelly had 
a remarkable scoop. Rather than a monotonous vista of dirt and dust (Greg Kelly 
recounts, 2008) audiences around the world could witness the transformation of a 
large city’s impressive roads and infrastructure into a confusing and chaotic bat-
tlefield. Kelly’s footage contains some disturbing material such as a civilian car, 
whose occupants must be either dead or dying, slamming into the median barrier 
of a modern motorway after passing between two of the armoured vehicles with 
which he was travelling (The thunder run, 2010). However, although we also see 
Staff Sergeant Jason Diaz’s burning and abandoned Abrams tank—an early indica-
tor that the engagement was not entirely one-sided (ibid.; Zucchino, 2004a)—the 
mere fact that Kelly and his cameraman Mal James were able to stand up and record 
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their footage demonstrates that any firing we can hear is mainly, if not entirely, 
outgoing, and therefore American.  His description of the ‘civilian vehicles, white 
pick-up trucks [which] come at us almost on suicide missions’ is not as far-fetched 
as it first seems (Greg Kelly reflects, 2010).  For instance, after the fall of Baghdad 
large quantities of regime documents were captured and analysed which showed 
the pre-war efforts of the Saddam Fedayeen to develop unconventional capabilities 
involving car bombs and suicide vests (Woods & Lacey, 2007). Yet in other parts 
of the city residents were attempting to go about their affairs while unaware of 
the depth of the American penetration (The thunder run, 2008; Zucchino, 2004a). 
Kelly appeared unwilling or unable to explore this paradox.  The Americans’ desire 
to minimise their own casualties created an environment in which any vehicle ap-
proaching the column was considered a threat.  Although he explained that some of 
the civilian vehicles destroyed produced secondary explosions which might indicate 
they contained munitions of some sort (Greg Kelly recounts, 2008), he never fully 
addresses how feasible it was for Iraqi motorists to interpret machine-gun tracer 
fire into the road in front of them as a signal to slow down and stop (The thunder 
run, 2008; Zucchino, 2004a). This failing caused him to inadvertently become a 
source only capable of conveying the views of the organisation upon whom  he 
was meant to be reporting.
After watching Kelly’s video, General Blount was convinced Saddam’s forces 
were on the brink of total collapse and approved a thrust aimed at the symbols 
of the regime’s rule (Lacey, 2007).  This was considered so risky that on April 
7 only main battle tanks were initially used and all crews were to remain inside 
their vehicles with their hatches secured (Zucchino, 2004a).  As a result, at first the 
Fox News team was unable to accompany the forces employed and even when it 
was deemed safe enough to use the more lightly armoured M113s in which they 
usually rode, the threat of hostile small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire 
prevented Fox from securing any additional footage.  The only broadcasting Kelly 
did that day was at the behest of the 2nd Brigade’s commanding officer Colonel 
David Perkins.  He and cameraman Mal James briefly left the relative safety of 
their vehicle to film a short piece to camera on the steps of one of Saddam’s gaudy 
palaces (Zucchinoa).  However, this was not the only proof that American forces 
had been right into the city’s centre. Determined to prove the inaccuracy of Iraqi 
Information Minister Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf’s statements, Perkins allowed 
his troops to put a tank main gun round into Saddam’s equestrian statue by the 
‘Hands of Victory’ Monument (ibid.; Soldiers destroying statue in Iraq, 2006) in 
case his lack of fuel caused him to withdraw.  This violent destruction of the Iraqi 
leader’s image was more emblematic of the entire campaign; one which was far 
from ‘bloodless’ or devoid of risk and which by this stage had already cost the lives 
of thousands of Iraqis (Conroy & Martz, 2005; Lacey). However, all this was to 
be overshadowed by the fate of another statue a short distance away.  
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Run to Paradise
The most memorable images from the Battle of Baghdad and indeed, the entire 
Second Gulf War, were provided on April 9 in Firdos Square, just across the 
Tigris River from where the 3rd Infantry continued to engage in occasionally 
intense firefights (Conroy & Martz, 2005).  Once again, although still acting in 
a diversionary role, (Reynolds, 2007; West and Smith, 2003) the US Marine 
Corps was to take centre stage in a defining image event.  Neither Fox nor any 
other news outlet had reporters embedded with the Marines responsible for the 
toppling of the large statue of Saddam.  Although there were discussions by 
senior commanders about the need to find targets that demonstrated the end of 
Ba’athist rule (Reynolds, 2007), this had not initially been conveyed to the Ma-
rines in Firdos Square.  As the Iraqi Information Ministry minders who always 
accompanied the foreign media had failed to turn up for work that morning, 
the international correspondents already in Baghdad knew the regime had col-
lapsed (Zucchino, 2004a).  While strolling a short distance from their hotel they 
encountered a small group of Iraqis gathered in the square, intent on destroying 
any symbols of Saddam they could find (McLaughlin, 2008).  However, the 
statute on which they were venting their fury proved  impervious to all their 
efforts.  The arrival of the Marines dramatically changed the dynamics of the 
situation (ibid.) and, at the suggestion of a US Army psychological operations 
team (Zucchino, 2004b), they used one of their armoured recovery vehicles 
to topple the statue, to the evident delight of the crowd (Saddam statue falls, 
2012). 
This footage was beamed around the world by Abu Dhabi TV and quickly 
picked up by Fox News Corporation.  At Fox’s headquarters, a studio team 
comprising their most senior commentators provided their own contextualisa-
tion.  One of them was Brit Hume, a former ABC News chief White House 
correspondent who had previously won an Emmy for his work during the First 
Gulf War (On air personalities, n.d.).  Hume and other members of Fox News 
would have been aware of the potential for historic drama over the coming days. 
Nor could they have been unaware of Fox’s role in the continuous campaign 
mode of America’s Republican Party (Swint, 2008). He described the events in 
Firdos Square as being ‘extraordinarily effective in conveying to the world what 
the [G. W. H. Bush] administration said and promised it was trying to achieve’ 
(Saddam statue falls, 2012).  Hume had become what  Herman (1999) would 
call a primary definer, effectively acting as spokesperson, through Fox, for the 
government’s position.  He went on to declare:
If this had been planned in some way [the destruction of the statue], and 
manifestly it was not, [as] we can tell, it could hardly be a more effective 
and powerful message.
202  PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 24 (1) 2018
DISASTERS, CYCLONES AND COMMUNICATION
Yet, as Los Angeles Times correspondent David Zucchino (2004b) showed, 
there was a degree of opportunistic manipulation of the crowd by the US military 
that day.  Equally importantly, what the footage from Firdos Square did not show 
was the widespread looting and sporadic fighting that was occurring only a few 
blocks away (Zucchino, 2004a).  In many ways the events in Firdos Square could 
be said to have been the highpoint of the US invasion of Iraq (Ricks, 2006).  As 
Iraq began to spiral into the abyss, perhaps the most powerful message of April 
9 was not the new American global assertiveness to which Brit Hume intended 
to draw attention; but rather the limits of US influence and decision making.  
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